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Abstract 
 
Social interactions are at the essence of societies and explain the gathering of individuals in 
villages,  agglomerations,  or  cities.  We  study  the  emergence  of  multiple  agglomerations  as 
resulting from the interplay between spatial interaction externalities and competition in the land 
market. We show that the geographical nature of the residential space tremendously affects the 
properties  of  spatial  equilibria.  In  particular,  when  agents  locate  on  an  open  land  strip  (line 
segment), a single city emerges in equilibrium. In contrast, when the spatial economy extends 
along a closed land strip (circumference), multiple equilibria with odd numbers of cities arise. 
Spatial equilibrium configurations involve a high degree of spatial symmetry in terms of city size 
and location, and can be Pareto-ranked.  
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A major source of spatial heterogeneity stems from non-market interactions. Social inter-
actions through face-to-face contacts are at the essence of our societies and explain the
gathering of individuals in villages, agglomerations, or cities. They translate a psycholog-
ical need for maintaining relationships with one another, and favor a constant exchange
of ideas; see Krugman (1991), Glaeser and Scheinkman (2003), and Fujita and Thisse
(2002). In this paper we address the issue of the emergence of multiple agglomerations as
the result of the interplay between social interactions and competition in the land market.
The present paper builds on Beckmann￿ s (1976) model. This model provides a sim-
ple rationale for the spatial agglomeration of agents as the result of spatial interaction
externalities. Agents are distributed along some geographical space and bene￿t from so-
cial interactions with other agents. These social interactions provide individuals with a
social interaction bene￿t while entailing an individual cost as each one must access to
distant agents. Moreover the return of spatial interactions is also balanced by a cost
of residence as agents compete for land space. When the bene￿t of social interactions
is larger than the commuting and residence costs, agents prefer to locate close to each
other, which leads to the formation of agglomerations. In his original work, Beckmann
considered the case of a one-dimensional spatial economy extending along an open land
strip (line segment). The resulting equilibrium consists in a uni-modal symmetric - bell-
shaped - spatial distribution, where agents agglomerate around the city centre, see Fujita
and Thisse (2002).
In this paper, ￿rst we revisit Beckmann (1976)￿ s model and then extend it to the
case of a spatial economy extending along a closed land strip (circumference). While the
modelling along an open land strip seems appropriate to describe the internal structure of
cities, the formulation along a closed land strip provides a natural framework to analyze
the interaction between multiple agglomerations. Circular spatial frameworks have been
studied in ￿ racetrack economy￿models in the context of the New Economic Geography
literature, see e.g. Fujita et al. (1999), Mossay (2003), or Picard and Tabuchi (2009). Yet,
2because of the complexity of market interactions, this strand of literature has been able
to characterize only a small subset of equilibrium distributions (e.g. the uniform spatial
distribution of agents, often referred to as the ￿ ￿ at-earth￿distribution, or constant-access
equilibria). As a consequence, this strand of literature has left unresolved issues dealing
with the nature and structure of other equilibrium distributions. Among these issues,
are the multiplicity of those other equilibria, their possible spatial symmetry, and the
allocation of land between inhabited areas and empty hinterlands. Because our social
interaction model has a much simpler structure than that involved in market interaction
models, we are able to address the above issues and characterize spatial equilibria.
Our results are the following. First we determine the equilibrium and ￿rst-best spa-
tial distributions of agents along an open land strip. Social interactions generate the
emergence of a single city, meaning that multiple cities can￿ t be sustained in equilib-
rium along a line. This result is similar to that obtained by Berliant et al. (2002) who
also showed the emergence of a unique centre in the case of production externalities. In
accordance to Fujita and Thisse (2002), the ￿rst-best distribution is more concentrated
than the equilibrium one; see also Tabuchi (1986). At equilibrium agents choose a too
large lot size because they do not internalize other agents￿preferences when making their
own lot choice. Second we provide the characterization of spatial equilibria emerging
along a closed land strip (circular geographical space). In equilibrium, cities are identical
and evenly spaced: cities share the same spatial structure and successive ￿rms along the
circumference are equidistant. We also show that equilibrium con￿gurations involve an
odd number of cities. Furthermore spatial equilibria can be Pareto-ranked. The total
welfare of the spatial economy decreases with the number of cities so that the one-city
con￿guration Pareto dominates all the other con￿gurations. Like in the open land strip
framework, the ￿rst-best distribution corresponds to a single city structure which is more
concentrated than the equilibrium distribution.
Our paper deals with the endogenous formation of multiple-centre con￿gurations. A
contribution of Berliant et al. (2002) is that the nature of spatial externalities matters and
3a⁄ects the properties of spatial equilibria. In Fujita and Ogawa (1980, 1982), multiplicity
of equilibria arises because of a ￿xed factor in the production process. In contrast, the
spatial production externalities analyzed by Berliant et al. (2002) lead to the formation of
a single centre in equilibrium. Our paper identi￿es another factor a⁄ecting the properties
of spatial equilibria, namely the nature of the geographical space itself. Our results
suggest that loops within a network favour the emergence of multiple cities as opposed to
the unique centre emerging along a line segment. To our knowledge, this paper constitutes
the very ￿rst step toward the characterization of interacting economies extending along
spatial (road) networks that involve a loop. In constrast to Fujita and Ogawa (1980,
1982) and Berliant et al. (2002), our model is analytically tractable because of the linear
structure of the model. For that reason we are able to perform a full general equilibrium
analysis, without assuming inelastic land consumption or relying on simulations.
Our paper also contributes to the literature on city structure in a particular way.
Since von Thunen, most theoretical works about city structures make the assumption
of revolution symmetry around the city centre in order to reduce the spatial dimension
from 2 to 1. Recent works on endogenous city formation still make that convenient
assumption (e.g. Lucas and Rossi-Hansberg, 2002). As such, it is important to check
whether revolution symmetry can be derived as an equilibrium property of a spatial
economy where agents can locate freely. Since revolution symmetry does not obtain in
our model, our paper sheds some doubt on the use of the revolution symmetry assumption
made in the existing literature.
We present the model of social interactions in Section 2. We derive the equilibrium and
the ￿rst-best spatial distributions of the model along an open line in Section 3. Section
4 characterizes spatial equilibria along a circumference. Section 5 ranks these various
equilibria and compares them with the socially optimal distribution.
42 The Model
In this Section we present the economic environment. A unit-mass of agents is distributed
along a one-dimensional geographical space according to the density ￿(x) with
R
￿(x)dx =
1. Agents travel along the one-dimensional road and bene￿t from social contacts with
other agents. The social utility that an agent in location x derives from interacting with
other agents is given by
S(x) = A ￿
Z
￿(y)T(x ￿ y)dy (1)
The ￿rst term A denotes the total return from interacting with other agents. The second
term re￿ ects the cost of trips of accessing to distant agents.1 We consider the case of a
linear cost function T(x ￿ y) = 2￿ jx ￿ yj, where ￿ measures the intensity of travelling
costs. In our model each agent interacts with all the other agents meaning that A will be
assumed to be large enough to ensure that S(x) ￿ 0, for any location x. The surplus S(x)
can be interpreted in a context of certainty or uncertainty. Indeed, it can be interpreted
literally as the utility derived by an individual who plans to interact with all other agents
with probability 1. It can also be interpreted as the expected utility of an individual who
plans to interact with a subset of agents whom location and identity are not known at the
time of the residence choice. Such an interpretation applied to the case of shopkeepers,
sellers, as well as workers who expect to hold several jobs at di⁄erent locations during their
lifetime, or employers who do not have a precise idea about future workers￿residences.
In each location x, the residential area is longitudinal to the main road. It is a strip
of land space with unit width, which is connected by its edge to the main road. Agents
in location x consume a composite good z(x) and some land space s(x). Their utility U
is given by
U(x) = S (x) + z(x) ￿
￿
2 s(x)
1Note that the term (
R
￿(y)T(x ￿ y)dy) could be formulated as a monetary cost. Anyway such a
reformulation would have no incidence on our analysis.
5where S(x) is the social utility as given by relation (1) and ￿ re￿ ects the preference for
land. The budget constraint faced by agents is
z(x) + R(x)s(x) = Y
where Y is the income and R(x) denotes the land rent in x.2 By using this budget
constraint, the utility derived in location x can be rewritten as
U(x) = S (x) ￿
￿
2 s(x)
￿ s(x)R(x) + Y (2)
This formulation of the utility function di⁄ers from Beckmann￿ s formulation in one
respect only: we consider an hyperbolic preference for land instead of the logarithmic
preference used in Beckmann (1976) and Fujita and Thisse (2002). This will allow us to
simplify considerably the characterization of equilibria.
Landlords raise the land rent until no worker moves. Let U￿ be an equilibrium utility
of workers. The bid rent function is given by
￿(x) = max
s
S (x) ￿ ￿=(2s) + Y ￿ U￿
s
which yields the optimal land consumption s￿(x) as determined by ￿=[2s￿(x)] = s￿ (x)￿￿(x)
= [S￿ (x)+Y ￿U￿]=2. At the residential equilibrium, land rents are equal to the bid rents
so that R￿(x) = ￿￿(x), which implies that s￿R￿(x) = ￿=(2s￿(x)). The indirect utility can
then be written as U(x) = S (x) ￿ ￿=s￿(x) + Y . Since the land strip has a unit width,
the individual land consumption s￿(x) corresponds to 1=￿(x), so that the indirect utility
in location x can be written in terms of the population density ￿(x) as
V (x) = S (x) ￿ ￿￿(x) + Y (3)
This means that the residents￿utility at location x linearly increases with the social
return S(x) and linearly decreases with the residential density ￿(x). Utility decreases
2In the context of a general equilibrium, the variable Y should be interpreted as the valuation of an
initial endowment of the composite good z.
6with the residential density because agents compete for land space and thus face higher
land prices in more populated areas. We will take advantage of this linear structure to
characterize spatial equilibria and the optimal spatial distribution. The characterization
of these spatial con￿gurations constitutes the major contribution of our paper to the
existing literature. In what follows we assume without much loss of generality that land
has no other use than residence so that the opportunity cost of land is zero.
3 Spatial Equilibrium along a Line Segment
In this Section we formulate our social interaction model along a line segment as studied
in Beckmann (1976) and Fujita and Thisse (2002, Chapter 6).
3.1 Spatial Equilibrium
A distribution of agents ￿(:) constitutes a spatial equilibrium if agents have no incentive
to relocate. In other words, ￿(x) is a spatial equilibrium if V (x) = V when ￿(x) > 0
and V (x) ￿ V when ￿(x) = 0. Because agents reach the same utility over all inhabited
locations, we have that V 0(x) = V 00(x) = 0 for all x where ￿(x) > 0. In this paper, any
area with a positive population is referred to as a city. We now characterize the spatial
distribution along a line segment and show that spatial equilibrium implies the emergence
of a single city.
First let us consider a single city located along the interval [￿b;b], b > 0. By di⁄eren-
tiating the social utility expression (1) with respect to x, we have that
S
0(x) = 2￿
Z b
x
￿(y)dy ￿ 2￿
Z x
￿b
￿(y)dy
S
00(x) = ￿2￿ ￿(x) ￿ 2￿ ￿(x) = ￿4￿ ￿(x)
Because of linear travel costs, S00(x) reduces to a linear function of ￿. Hence, by using
relation (3), a necessary condition for equilibrium is V 00(x) = S00 (x) ￿ ￿￿00(x) = 0, which
7leads to
￿
00(x) + ￿
2￿(x) = 0 where ￿
2 ￿ 4￿=￿ (4)
The solution to this di⁄erential equation is given by
￿(x) = C cos[￿ (x ￿ xo)] (5)
where C and xo are constants to be determined. We can assume that the city is centered at
xo = 0 without loss of generality. Because R￿(￿b) = [￿(￿b)]2￿=2 = 0 and
R
￿(x)dx = 1,
the equilibrium spatial structure and the boundary of the city are given by
￿
￿(x) =
￿
2
cos(￿x) and b
￿ =
￿
2￿
(6)
This describes the spatial structure of a single city. The density is a concave function of
x. We must also ensure that each agent is willing to interact with all the other agents so
that S(x) > 0 for all x in (￿b￿;b￿). We need to assume that A >
R b
￿b ￿￿(y)T(y ￿ b)dy or
equivalently that A > ￿￿=￿ = ￿
p
￿￿=2. Note that the equilibrium utility level is given by
V
￿ = V
￿(x = 0) = A ￿
Z b
￿b
￿
￿(y)T(y)dy ￿ ￿￿
￿(0) + Y
= A ￿
￿ ￿ 2
￿
￿ ￿
1
2
￿￿ + Y = A ￿
￿
2
p
￿￿ + Y
An important issue is whether multiple cities can co-exist in equilibrium. The answer
turns out to be negative. To show this, consider a set of cities possibly separated by
empty hinterlands. Let the supports of the M ￿ 2 cities be the closed intervals [am;bm];
m = 1;2;3;:::, M; with bm < am+1. Indeed, within each city m, Equation (4) holds
and R￿(am) = R￿(bm) = 0, so that ￿(x) can be written as ￿m(x) = Cm cos[￿(x ￿ xm)],
8x 2 [am;bm], with xm = (bm ￿ am)=2. From Relations (1) and (3), we get
V (x) = A ￿ 2￿
M X
m=1
Z bm
am
￿(y)jx ￿ yjdy ￿ ￿￿(x) + Y
We show that some residents living in city M have an incentive to relocate. By di⁄eren-
tiating previous expression, we get
V
0(x) = ￿2￿
￿
1 ￿
Z bM
aM
￿M(y)dy
￿
￿2￿
Z x
aM
￿M(y)dy+2￿
Z bM
x
￿M(y)dy￿￿￿
0
M(x), 8x 2 [aM;bM]
8When a resident relocates to his right, he looses access to the residents to his left, who
live either in other cities (￿rst term) or in his own city (second term). He also gains a
better access to the residents to his right within his own city (third term). Finally, this
resident faces an increase in land rent if x 2 [aM;xM] or a decrease in this land rent if
x 2 [xM;bM]) (last term). In particular, at the centre of city M, ￿0
M(xM) = 0 and
V
0(xM) = ￿2￿
￿
1 ￿
Z bM
aM
￿M(y)dy
￿
= ￿2￿(1 ￿ LM) < 0
where LM denotes the population in city M. Therefore, residents living at the centre
of city M have always an incentive to move leftward, and no spatial con￿guration with
M ￿ 2 cities can￿ t be sustained in equilibrium.
We summarize our results in the following Proposition.
Proposition 1 If A > ￿
p
￿￿=2, the spatial equilibrium along a line segment is unique
and involves a single unimodal city. The equilibrium utility level decreases with the
travel cost (￿) and the preference for residential space (￿).
The spatial equilibrium distribution is symmetric with respect to location x = 0 and
concave. This distribution is similar to that obtained by Beckmann except that here the
city structure is nowhere convex because of our hyperbolic preference for residential space
and the zero opportunity cost of land.
Also the spatial equilibrium distribution involves a unique centre. This result is similar
to that obtained by Berliant et al. (2002) in the case of spatial knowledge spillovers.
3.2 First-Best Spatial Distribution
In this subsection we determine the ￿rst-best distribution of agents as opposed to the
equilibrium distribution analyzed so far. A utilitarian planner chooses the best spatial
distribution of agents ￿(:) and the city border b so as to maximize the total welfare denoted
by W. In the ￿rst best, the planner chooses the residents￿locations so that there is no
land market: R(x) = 0. The planner￿ s program is therefore
9max
￿(:);b
W =
R b
￿bU(x)￿(x)dx =
R b
￿b[S(x) + z(x) ￿
￿
2 s(x)
]￿(x)dx (7)
subject to the budget balance
R b
￿b[Y ￿z(x)]￿(x)dx = 0 and the total population constraint
R b
￿b￿(x)dx = 1. Substituting the budget balance into the above expression yields
max
￿(:);b
W =
R b
￿b[S(x) ￿
￿
2 s(x)
+ Y ]￿(x)dx
=
R b
￿b[A ￿
R b
￿b￿(y)T(x ￿ y)dy ￿ ￿=2￿(x) + Y ]￿(x)dx
By using varational analysis, we show in Appendix A that the ￿rst-best distribution
satis￿es the following relationships
S(x) ￿
￿
2
￿(x) =
A + ￿ ￿ Y
2
￿(b) + ￿(￿b) = 0 (8)
where ￿ > 0 is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the total population constraint.
This characterization yields two conclusions. First, it should be that ￿(b) = ￿(￿b) = 0
since ￿(x) ￿ 0. Second, the function S(x) ￿ (￿=2)￿(x) is constant so that its ￿rst and
second derivatives should be nil. Note that this function is similar to the expression of
the indirect utility derived in the decentralized equilibrium analysis, see expression (3),
except that ￿ is to be replaced by ￿=2. Therefore, it should be that at the optimum
￿00(x) + (￿o)2￿(x), where (￿o)2 = 4￿=(￿=2) = 2￿2. This means that ￿o(x) = Co cos￿ox
with the city border bo determined by ￿o(bo) = 0, that is bo = ￿=(2￿o), and Co = ￿o=2
given the total population constraint.
Hence we oberve that the optimal city has a narrower support than the decentralized
city, bo < b￿. Because the ￿rst-best and the equilibrium cities host the same number of
residents, the density of residents must be larger at the ￿rst-best, Co > C￿.
We summarize our results in the following Proposition.
Proposition 2 The ￿rst-best spatial distribution is unimodal and the optimal city is
more concentrated than the equilibrium city.
10In accordance to Fujita and Thisse (2002), the ￿rst-best distribution is more concen-
trated than the equilibrium one; see also Tabuchi (1986). At equilibrium agents choose a
too large lot size because they do not internalize other agents￿preferences when making
their own lot choice.
4 Spatial Equilibrium along a Circumference
In this Section we consider the robustness of previous results with respect to another form
of geographical space. In particular we want to check whether spatial interactions along
a line which is closed, such as a circumference, lead to the formation of a single city or to
the emergence of multiple centres. The equilibrium characterization is more di¢ cult to
obtain along such a geographical space. For the sake of comparison with the equilibrium
on a line segment, we therefore focus on the formation of unimodal cities and show that
spatial equilibria can involve multiple cities. A major contribution of this paper is to
provide the characterization of such multiple agglomerations in equilibrium.
To obtain our results, we proceed in several steps. Like in previous Section, we ￿rst de-
rive a necessary equilibrium condition (Lemma 1). This condition expresses the trade-o⁄
between the residence cost and the accessing cost to other agents. We then derive another
necessary equilibrium condition (Lemma 2) which simply states that an equilibrium dis-
tribution is of made of pieces, each of which having the shape of the cosine function as
obtained along the line segment in Section 3. We show that in equilibrium antipodal cities
can￿ t exist (i.e. cities can￿ t face each other along the circumference) (Lemma 3). This
subsequently implies that no equilibrium with an even number of cities can exist (Lemma
4). Finally we show that in equilibrium cities are equally populated and evenly spaced
(successive cities are equidistant) along the circumference (Proposition 3). Whereas it
may be intuitive that these spatial distributions constitute equilibria, it is far from obvi-
ous a priori to exclude other asymmetric distributions in terms of size or location. In this
Section we present our results as well as their interpretation.
11We discuss spatial con￿gurations involving cities separated by empty hinterlands along
a circumference of unit perimeter. M denotes the total number of cities and [am;bm] the
support of city m so that the support of the spatial distribution ￿ can be written as
supp￿ =
SM
m=1[am;bm]. Let H be the set of empty hinterlands that is the set of ￿ empty￿
locations so that H = [0;1]=supp￿. At equilibrium we must have that V (x) = V ￿,
8x 2supp￿ and V (x) ￿ V ￿, 8x 2 H.
Consider some agent located in city m so that x 2 [am;bm]. We de￿ne P +(x) (resp.
P ￿(x)) as the population that is located at a clockwise (resp. counterclockwise) distance
from x smaller than 1=2. This means that P +(x) and P ￿(x) divide the total population
into that at the right and that at the left of x. A ￿rst order di⁄erentiation of the indirect
utitity V (x) yields the following lemma.
Lemma 1 In equilibrium P +(x) ￿ P ￿(x) = ￿￿0(x)=(2￿), 8x 2supp￿.
Proof. See Appendix B.1.
This condition expresses the trade-o⁄ between the residence cost and the accessing
cost: in equilibrium an increase in residence cost must be compensated by a better access
to distant agents.3 So as to illustrate Lemma 1, suppose that ￿0(x) < 0, so that an
agent located at x enjoys a lower residence cost by moving clockwise. Lemma 1 says that
this gain in terms of residence cost should be balanced by a larger accessing cost. This
means that the population that the agent gets closer to (i.e. the population at his right,
P +) should be less numerous that the population he gets further away from (i.e. the
population at his left P ￿). The marginal residential cost of moving to the right or to the
left corresponds to the marginal gain of accessing to other agents.
Because agents may access to other agents by travelling to the right or to the left, they
will be sensitive to the fact that other agents may be located in the opposite location along
the circumference. For this reason, it is useful to rely on the concept of antipodal cities
3This condition between the residence and accessing costs is similar to Muth￿ s (1969) gradient condition
on land rents and commuting costs.
12which are de￿ned as cities ￿ facing￿each other along the circumference. More precisely,
the spatial distribution ￿(:) is said to admit antipodal cities if there exist two inhabited
locations x and x + 1=2, i.e. ￿(x)￿(x + 1=2) > 0. By contrast, there are no antipodal
cities if ￿(x)￿(x + 1=2) = 0 for every location x 2 [am;bm], m = 1;:::;M:
Di⁄erentiating once more the spatial indirect utility V (x) yields another necessary
condition, namely V 00(x) = 0. First we consider the case in the absence of antipodal
cities and show that each piece of the equilibrium distribution is determined by a spatial
structure similar to that given by expression (5). This is summarized in the following
Lemma.
Lemma 2 Consider a spatial structure involving M cities of support [am;bm], m =
1;:::;M. Suppose that there are no antipodal cities. Then, an equilibrium dis-
tribution is given by ￿(x) = Cm cos[￿(x ￿ xm)], 8x 2supp￿, where ￿2 = 4￿=￿,
￿(bm ￿ am) = ￿, xm = (bm ￿ am)=2, and Cm is a positive constant.
Proof. See Appendix B.2.
The structure of cities is given by the same cosine function as in the case of an economy
extending along a line segment, see expression (6). Note that Lemma 2 applies to spatial
economies with no antipodal cities only. In what follows we show that in fact no antipodal
cities can exist. In order to illustrate this, we show that a spatial con￿guration consisting
of 2 symmetric antipodal cities located at the North and the South of the circumference
(x = 0 and x = 1=2) can not be sustained in equilibrium. The supports of these cities are
denoted by [￿b;b] and [1=2 ￿ b;1=2 + b], see left panel in Figure 1. By applying Lemma
1 in locations x 2 [￿b;b] and x + 1=2, we get
￿
0(x) + ￿
0(x + 1=2) =
2￿
￿
￿
P
+(x) ￿ P
￿(x) + P
+(x + 1=2) ￿ P
￿(x + 1=2)
￿
Given that P +(x) = P ￿(x + 1=2) and P ￿(x) = P +(x + 1=2), the RHS of the above
relation is equal to 0, which leads to an inconsistency given that in our example, ￿0(x) =
￿0(x + 1=2) 6= 0 if x 6= 0. The above condition actually implies that if ￿0(x) > 0 then
13￿0(x + 1=2) < 0: if equilibrium land rents increase in location x, they should necessarily
decrease in location x + 1=2. As a consequence, if ￿0(￿b) > 0, then ￿0(1=2 ￿ b) should be
negative which would imply some negative population levels. This situation is illustrated
in the left panel of Figure 1.
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE.
The following Lemma generalizes the argument made above and rules out any spatial
distribution involving antipodal cities in equilibrium.
Lemma 3 There exists no spatial equilibrium with antipodal cities, except the uniform
distribution.
A ￿rst implication of Lemma 3 is that, except the uniform equilibrium, any spatial
equilibrium distribution involves empty hinterlands. Such spatial equilibria result from
the natural tension between the supply and the residents￿self-organized use of space.
Indeed, in equilibrium, when residents in a particular city have no arbitrage opportunity,
the population density follows the law given in Lemma 2. This law determines not only the
use of space in each city but also the city support (i.e. [am;bm]). As a consequence, there
is no reason for which the union of city supports,
S
m[am;bm], should ￿t the available
space on the circumference. This is what explains the existence of empty hinterlands
between cities. The present characterization of equilibria contrasts with that obtained
in the existing racetrack models of spatial agglomeration that faced a sharp di¢ culty
to identify equilibria other than the uniform spatial distribution, called ￿ ￿ at earth￿ , and
constant-access equilibria (see for instance Fujita et al. (1999), Mossay (2003), and Picard
and Tabuchi (2009)). The present paper identi￿es a new class of spatial equilibria ignored
so far in the existing literature.
A second implication of Lemma 3 lies in the impossibility to get equilibria with an
even number of cities. As an illustration, let us explain the argument for a con￿guration
14that would involve an even number of identical cities. By Lemma 3, we know that these
cities can￿ t be antipodal. Suppose that cities are located at asymmetric distances. The
case of 2 such cities is depicted in the right panel of Figure 1. By applying Lemma 1 at
the centre xm of a city, we get that P +(xm) = P ￿(xm) because the land rent gradient is
nil at the city centre (￿0(xm) = 0). This means that the populations at the right and at
the left of the city centre xm should be equal, which is inconsistent with our example since
one side of the city will involve an even number of cities while the other side will involve
an odd number of cities, given that the total number of cities is even. In this example,
the argument applies because cities are of equal size. The following Lemma extends the
argument to the case of spatial distributions involving cities of di⁄erent size.
Lemma 4 Any non-uniform spatial equilibrium displays an odd number of cities.
Proof. See Appendix B.3.
What is now left to be determined is the size of cities and their location along the
circumference. In Appendix B:4, we apply an argument used in Lemma 4 to pairs of
cities located on the circumference. Then we show that such pairs of cities have an
identical population size in equilibrium. By inference, all cities must have the same size.
Furthermore, once cities have an identical size, it is easy to understand why they should be
evemly spaced along the circumference. This is because any asymmetry in the location
of these cities would necessarily confer an advantage to residents of some city and a
disavantage to residents of some other city, thus precluding equilibrium. We summarize
our results in the following Proposition.
Proposition 3 The set of spatial equilibria consists of the uniform distribution (the
￿ ￿ at earth￿distribution) as well as any odd number of identical and evenly spaced
non-antipodal cities, each of which having an internal structure as given by Lemma
2.
Proof. See Appendix B.4.
15In contrast to Beckmann￿ s result (1976) and Fujita and Thisse (2002), multiple-city
con￿gurations do emerge along a circular geographical space. The characterization of spa-
tial equilibria is obtained in the context of a general equilibrium analysis due to the linear
structure of the model. It implies the existence of empty hinterlands and a high degree
of spatial symmetry in terms of size and location. According to Lemma 4, con￿gurations
with an even number of cities do not exist, and antipodal cities can￿ t be sustained, see
Lemma 3.
In equilibrium, the support of cities should ￿t the unit perimeter of the circumference
(2M￿=￿ < 1), so that the maximum number of cities is given by Mmax =int(￿=(2￿)). On
the other hand, since the total population is 1, we have that M
R ￿
2￿
￿ ￿
2￿ C cos(￿x)dx = 1,
meaning that Cm = C = ￿=(2M), 8m. These two last conditions put an upper bound
Mmax on the admissible number of cities and relate the amplitude C of each city to the
total number of cities M.
The existing literature already emphasized the type of spatial externalities in deter-
mining the number of centres emerging in equilibrium, see Berliant et al. (2002). Our
results contribute heavily to the theoretical understanding of multiple centres. Proposi-
tions 1 and 3 identify the geographical space itself (circumference vs. line segment) as
a⁄ecting the properties of spatial equilibria (multiplicity vs. uniqueness of centres).
Since von Thunen, most theoretical works related to the study of urban agglomerations
have assumed (revolution) symmetry around city centres. Recent works on endogenous
city formation still make that convientient assumption, e.g. Lucas and Rossi-Hansberg
(2002). In our social interaction model, revolution symmetry does not necessarily hold
along a circumference. As such, our analysis sheds some doubt on the use of that assump-
tion made in the literature.
165 Pareto-Ranking of Equilibria and Optimum
In this Section we rank the spatial equilibria obtained in Section 4 in the sense of Pareto.
Then we compare the Pareto dominating equilibrium with the ￿rst-best distribution.
Consider a spatial equilibrium with an odd number M of identical evenly spaced non-
antipodal cities as given by Proposition 3. With no loss of generality, we assume that the
￿rst city is centered at x = 0. In equilibrium the utility is the same for all residents and
corresponds to the utility of residents located at x = 0, which is given by
V
￿(M) = A ￿ ￿￿(a1 +
￿
2￿
) ￿
XM
m=1
Z am+ ￿
￿
am
T(a1 +
￿
2￿
;y)￿(y)dy + Y
where am corresponds to the left-border of city m. Developments given in Appendix C:1
lead to
V
￿(M) = A ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ 2
￿M
￿ ￿
M2 ￿ 1
2M2 ￿
2￿
￿M
+ Y
The ￿rst term represents the bene￿t of social interactions, the second one the agent￿ s
travel cost to other agents in their own city, the third one the travel cost to agents living
in other cities, and the next to last one the land rent. It can be shown that V ￿(M) is a
decreasing function in the admissible interval [1;￿=(2￿)]. Therefore spatial equilibria can
be ranked as sumarized in the following Proposition.
Proposition 4 The smaller the number of cities, the larger the total welfare of the
equilibrium distribution. If ￿ > 2￿ (resp. ￿ < 2￿), then the Pareto-dominating
spatial equilibrium con￿guration corresponds to a single city distribution (resp. the
uniform distribution).
Proof. Appendix C.2
Of course, when no city as given by Lemma 2 can ￿t the unit perimeter of the cir-
cumference, the only possible equilibrium is the uniform distribution ￿(x) = 1. Now we
determine the ￿rst-best distribution of residents along the circumference.
17Proposition 5 When ￿ > ￿ (resp. ￿ < ￿), the optimal spatial con￿guration corresponds
to a single city distribution with welfare A ￿ ￿
p
￿￿=(2
p
2) + Y (resp. the uniform
spatial distribution of agents with welfare A ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿=2 + Y ).
Proof. Appendix C.3
Like in Beckmann￿ s framework in Section 3:2, the social optimum involves a single
city which is more concentrated than the equilibrium distribution. Of course, this occurs
provided that the optimal city can ￿t the unit perimeter. Otherwise, the ￿rst-best distri-
bution corresponds to the uniform distribution of agents. While an increase of the travel
cost (￿) favours the optimal agglomeration, an increase of the preference for residential
space (￿) favours the optimal uniform distribution of residents.
6 Conclusion
We have studied a spatial model of social interactions. We have shown that only a single
city can emerge along a line segment. On the other hand, along a circumference, multiple
equilibria can emerge. We have shown that in equilibrium, cities are identical, in odd
numbers, and evenly spaced along the circumference. The smaller the number of cities, the
larger the total welfare of the spatial economy. The ￿rst-best distribution corresponds to
a single city which is more concentrated than the equilibrium city. Our paper constitutes
a very ￿rst analysis toward the characterization of spatial equilibria along spatial (road)
networks that include loops. It identi￿es the geographical space itself as a very important
factor a⁄ecting the properties of spatial equilibria (multiplicity, size, spacing).
18Appendix
6.1 Appendix A: Proof of S(x) ￿ ￿=2￿(x) = (A + ￿ ￿ Y )=2 and
￿(b) + ￿(￿b) = 0
Proof. The Lagrange functional L of problem (7) can be written as
L =
R b
￿b[S(x) ￿
￿
2
￿(x) + Y ]￿(x)dx ￿ ￿[
R b
￿b￿(x)dx ￿ 1]
where ￿ is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the total population constraint and
we used ￿(x) = 1=s(x).
First, we determine a ￿rst-order condition with respect to the city border b. By
di⁄erentiating the above expression with respect to b, we get
[S(b) ￿
￿
2
￿(b) + Y ￿ ￿]￿(b) + [S(￿b) ￿
￿
2
￿(￿b) + Y ￿ ￿]￿(￿b) = 0 (9)
Second, we determine the ￿rst-order condition with respect to the spatial distribution
￿. By using Relation (1), the Lagrange functional can be rewritten as
L =
R b
￿b[A ￿
R b
￿b￿(y)T(x ￿ y)dy ￿ ￿=2￿(x) + Y ]￿(x)dx ￿ ￿[
R b
￿b￿(x)dx ￿ 1]
Now consider some in￿nitesimally small variation e ￿(x) around the optimal solution ￿(x).
The variation of L is given by
e L =
R b
￿b[(A + Y ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿￿(x)]e ￿(x)dx
￿
R b
￿b
R b
￿bT(x ￿ y)￿(y)e ￿(x)dxdy ￿
R b
￿b
R b
￿bT(x ￿ y)￿(x)e ￿(y)dxdy
=
R b
￿b[(A + Y ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿￿(x) ￿ 2
R b
￿bT(x ￿ y)dy￿(y)]e ￿(x)dx
given that
R b
￿b
R b
￿bT(x ￿ y)￿(x)e ￿(y)dxdy =
R b
￿b
R b
￿bT(y ￿ x)￿(y)e ￿(x)dxdy =
R b
￿b
R b
￿bT(x ￿
y)￿(y)e ￿(x)dxdy by using the symmetry of T(x). At the optimum, e L must be equal to
zero for any admissible variation e ￿(x) around the optimal distribution ￿(x): This implies
successively
(A + Y ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿￿(x) ￿ 2
R b
￿bT(x ￿ y)dy￿(y) = 0
2[A ￿
R b
￿bT(x ￿ y)dy￿(y)] ￿ ￿￿(x) = A + ￿ ￿ Y
19S(x) ￿
￿
2
￿(x) =
A + ￿ ￿ Y
2
Therefore the function S(x) ￿ (￿=2)￿(x) is a constant. Finally, by substituting this
last expression evaluated in x = b and x = ￿b into expression (9), we get
[
A + ￿ ￿ Y
2
+ Y ￿ ￿][￿(b) + ￿(￿b)] = 0
which yields ￿(b) + ￿(￿b) = 0:
6.2 Appendix B.1: Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. The set of intervals f[am;bm]gm=1;:::;M denote the city supports. We need to
introduce additional de￿nitions to describe the location of cities with respect to each
other. We denote by I+
m (resp. I￿
m) the set of indices of cities that are located at a
clockwise (resp. counterclockwise) distance from interval m inferior to 1=2. We consider
an agent located at x 2 [am;bm]. When x + 1=2 = 2 H, we denote by jm the interval index
to which x+1=2 belongs to. The utility of an agent located in x 2 [am;bm] in city m can
then be written as
V (x) = A ￿ 2￿[
P
i2I+
m
R bi
ai (y ￿ x)￿(y)dy +
P
i2I￿
m
R bi
ai (1 ￿ (y ￿ x))￿(y)dy]
￿ 2￿[
R x
am(x ￿ y)￿(y)dy +
R bm
x (y ￿ x)￿(y)dy] ￿ ￿￿(x)
￿ 2￿￿supp￿(x + 1=2)
hR x+1=2
ajm (y ￿ x)￿(y)dy +
R bjm
x+1=2(1 ￿ (y ￿ x))￿(y)dy
i
+ Y
where ￿supp￿ denotes a characteristic function so that ￿supp￿(x) is equal 1, if x 2supp￿,
and 0 otherwise. By di⁄erentiation with respect to x, we get
￿2￿
P
i2I+
m
R bi
ai (￿1)￿(y)dy ￿ 2￿
P
i2I￿
m
R bi
ai (1)￿(y)dy ￿ 2￿
R x
am(1)￿(y)dy ￿ 2￿
R bm
x (￿1)￿(y)dy
+2￿￿supp￿(x + 1=2)
hR x+1=2
ajm ￿(y)dy ￿
R bjm
x+1=2￿(y)dy
i
￿ ￿￿
0(x) = 0
We get the stated result by writing P +(x) =
￿P
i2I+
m
R bi
ai +
R bm
x + ￿supp￿(x + 1=2)
R x+1=2
ajm
￿
￿(y)dy
and P ￿(x) =
￿P
i2I￿
m
R bi
ai +
R x
am + ￿supp￿(x + 1=2)
R bjm
x+1=2
￿
￿(y)dy.
20Appendix B.2. : Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. Like in Appendix B:1, I+
m (resp. I￿
m) denote the set of indices of cities that
are located at a clockwise (resp. counterclockwise) distance from interval m inferior to
1=2. Let us consider some agent located in city m at x 2 [am;bm]. Given that no city is
antipodal to city m, we have that x + 1=2 2 H. Given this, the First Order Condition
(FOC) provided in the Proof of Lemma 1 in Appendix B:1, V 0(x) = 0, can be written
now as
￿2￿
P
i2I+
m
R bi
ai (￿1)￿(y)dy ￿ 2￿
P
i2I￿
m
R bi
ai (1)￿(y)dy
￿2￿
R x
am(1)￿(y)dy ￿ 2￿
R bm
x (￿1)￿(y)dy ￿ ￿￿
0(x) = 0
By further di⁄erentiation with respect to x, we get
￿2￿￿(x) ￿ 2￿￿(x) ￿ ￿￿
00
(x) = 0
￿
00(x) + ￿
2￿(x) = 0
where ￿2 = 4￿=￿. The general solution to this di⁄erential equation is given by
￿(x) = Cm cos[￿ (x ￿ xm)]
where Cm and xm are constants to be determined. Note that in equilibrium, ￿(am) and
￿(bm) can￿ t be strictly positive. For instance, if ￿(bm) were strictly positive, then agents
in location bm would have an incentive to move to the hinterland in location bm + " with
" > 0 in￿nitesimally small. By doing so they would save a ￿nite marginal residence cost
while facing only an in￿nitesimal marginal accessing cost. Therefore ￿(bm ￿am) = ￿ and
xm = (bm ￿ am)=2.
21Appendix B.3: Proof of Lemma 4
Proof. By applying Lemma 1 at the centre xm of each city m, we get P +(xm)￿P ￿(xm) =
0, m = 1;2;:::;M. These conditions can be written in the following matrix form
2
6 6 6 6 6
6
4
0 a12 ￿￿￿ a1M
￿a12 0 ￿￿￿ a2M
. . .
. . . ... . . .
￿a1M ￿a2M ￿￿￿ 0
3
7 7 7 7 7 7
5
| {z }
A
2
6 6 6 6 6
6
4
P1
P2
. . .
PM
3
7 7 7 7 7
7
5
= 0
where aij 2 f￿1;+1g indicates whether j 2 I
￿
i (city j is a right-neighbor of city i) or
j 2 I
+
i (city j is a left-neighbor of city i). We refer to matrix A as the ￿ neighborhood￿
matrix.
It turns out that the determinant of a matrix can be expressed as detA =
P
￿2￿"(￿)
Q
￿iai￿i,
where ￿ is a permutation of f1;2;:::;Mg, ￿ the set of derangements of f1;2;:::;Mg, and
" : ￿ ! f￿1;1g. Given that the number of such derangements is odd when M is even
and aij 2 f￿1;1g for j 6= i, detA corresponds to a sum of an odd number of terms equal
to ￿1 or +1. Given this, whenever M is even, detA is non-zero and the only solution
to the linear system A P = 0, is P = 0. Note that when M is odd, detA = 0 because
A = ￿AT.
Appendix B.4: Proof of Proposition 3
As is the case in racetrack models of spatial agglomeration, the uniform distribution is a
trivial equilibrium. The point of our analysis is to focus on the characterization of other
equilibria.
First we prove that cities such as given by Lemma 2 should be equally populated and
that they should be evenly spaced along the circumference. Let M be an odd number of
cities that are clockwisely indexed. Let Pm be the population of city m and #I+
m (resp.
#I￿
m) be the number of cities that are located on the right (resp. left) of city m. We
de￿ne the following symmetry concept in the location of cities.
22De￿nition (Neighborhood Symmetry) A spatial distribution displays the neighbor-
hood symmetry if each city has the same number of cities on its left and on its right:
#I+
m = #I￿
m = (M ￿ 1)=2, 8m = 1;:::;M.
We also de￿ne pairs of cities located on the circumference as follows.
De￿nition (Paired Cities) Consider the centre xm of some city m and its symmetric
location xm+1=2 ￿ xm + 1=2. From that location, move clockwise (resp. coun-
terclockwise) to the next ￿rst city, say city j with centre xj. Then consider the
symmetric location of that centre xj, xj+1=2 ￿ xj + 1=2. Cities m and j are said to
be clockwisely paired (resp. counterclockwisely paired) if there is no other city in
the interval (xm;xj+1=2) (resp. (xj+1=2;xm)).
Given these de￿nitions, we establish the three following Lemmas.
Lemma B.4.1 If cities m and j are paired, then Pm = Pj.
Proof. Consider 2 paired cities m and j being clockwisely paired. By applying Lemma
1 at the centres of cities m and j, we have that P +(xm) = P ￿(xm) and P +(xj) = P ￿(xj).
This necessarily implies that Pm = Pj.
Lemma B.4.2 Under neighborhood symmetry, Pm = P, 8m.
Proof. First we show by contradiction that under neighborhood symmetry, each city
can be clockwisely and counterclockwisely paired. Assume that some city m can￿ t be
paired. By assumption it has (M ￿1)=2 right- and left- neighbors (i.e. #I+
m = #I￿
m). If it
can￿ t be paired, then there is a city, say city h, in the interval (xm;xj+1=2) or in the interval
(xj+1=2;xm), as described in the pairing construction. This implies that #I
+
h 6= #I
￿
h which
violates the neighborhood symmetry.
As each city m can be paired to cities m + M+1
2 and m + M￿1
2 , Pm = Pm+ M+1
2 =
Pm+ M￿1
2 , meaning that Pm = P, 8m.
23Lemma B.4.3 Neighborhood symmetry holds.
Proof. We show that if neighborhood symmetry didn￿ t hold, then there would be a
city with a negative population.
Step 1. We show that if neighborhood symmetry does not hold, then there exists some
city m that can￿ t be paired clockwisely. By assumption, there is some city m for which
the numbers of right- and left-neighbors are di⁄erent (i.e. #I+
m 6= #I￿
m). Consider the
clockwise pairing of cities, but city m. The maximum number of cities that can be paired
clockwisely is given by 2min(#I+
m, #I￿
m). This means the number of cities that remain
unpaired among the M ￿ 1 cities is at least given by max(#I+
m;#I￿
m)-min(#I+
m;#I￿
m).
This number is necessarily even. Even when accounting for the clockwise pairing of city
m, there will always remain at least a city that can￿ t be paired.
Step 2. Partition cities into cities that can be clockwisely paired and those that cannot
be. Consider two successive cities m (that can￿ t be clockwisely paired ) and m + 1 (that
can be clockwisely paired). Applying Lemma 1 at the centre of those cities implies that
Pm + Pm+1 = 0 so that the population of some city should be negative.
From Lemmas B:4:2 and B:4:3, it naturally follows that cities are equally populated.
Lemma B.4.4 All cities are equally populated, Pm = P = 1=M, 8m.
Given this Lemma we can show that successive cities along the circumference are
equidistant.
Lemma B.4.5 Cities are evenly spaced along the circumference (i.e. xm￿xm￿1 = 1=M ,
8m).
Proof. By Lemma B.4.4, we know that Pm = 1=M. The interaction costs for agents
located in city centres are given by
m < (M ￿ 1)=2 : ICm = 2￿f
Pk=m+(M￿1)=2
k=1 jxk ￿ xmj +
PM
k=m￿(M￿1)=2+M[1 ￿ (xk ￿ xm)g
m = (M ￿ 1)=2 : IC(M￿1)=2 = 2￿f
P
k6=(M￿1)=2
￿ ￿xk ￿ x(M￿1)=2
￿ ￿
m > (M ￿ 1)=2 : ICm = 2￿f
Pk=M
k=m￿(M￿1)=2+1 jxk ￿ xmj +
Pm+(M￿1)=2￿M
k=1 [1 ￿ (xm ￿ xk)]g
24Because of the neighborhood symmetry and Lemma B.4.4, these costs ICm should be
equal - say to C-. We then have
Ax = b
where bT = [C ￿ (M ￿ 1)=2;:::;C ￿ 1;C;C + 1;:::;C + (M ￿ 1)=2]=(2￿), and A is the
neighborhood matrix introduced in Appendix B:3.
It turns out that matrix A has rank M ￿ 1. This is because the minor (m;m) of A is
a neighborhood matrix corresponding to a con￿guration where city m has been removed,
and thus is of rank M ￿ 1 since the determinant of a neighborhood matrix is non zero
when the number of cities is even, see Proof of Lemma 4 in Appendix B:3. Then the
unique solution to Ax = b is necessarily xm ￿ xm￿1 = M￿1, 8m.
Appendix C.1: Proof of V ￿(M) = A ￿ ￿ ￿￿2
￿M ￿ ￿ M2￿1
2M2 ￿ 2￿
￿M + Y
Consider an equilibrium with an odd number M of identical evenly spaced cities. The
equilibrium utility is given by
V
￿(M) = A ￿ ￿￿(a1 +
￿
2￿
) ￿
XM
m=1
Z am+ ￿
￿
am
T(a1 +
￿
2￿
;y)￿(y)dy + Y
= A ￿ ￿￿(a1 +
￿
2￿
) ￿
Z a1+ ￿
￿
a1
T(a1 +
￿
2￿
;y)￿(y)dy
￿
X M+1
2
m=2
Z am+ ￿
￿
am
T(a1 +
￿
2￿
;y)￿(y)dy ￿
XM
m= M+1
2 +1
Z am+ ￿
￿
am
T(a1 +
￿
2￿
;y)￿(y)dy + Y
25which gives
V
￿(M) = A ￿ ￿￿(a1 +
￿
2￿
) ￿ 2￿
Z a1+ ￿
2￿
a1
(a1 +
￿
2￿
￿ y)￿(y)dy
￿ 2￿
Z a1+ ￿
￿
a1+ ￿
2￿
(y ￿ (a1 +
￿
2￿
))￿(y)dy + Y
￿ 2￿
X M+1
2
m=2
Z am+ ￿
￿
am
(y ￿ (a1 +
￿
2￿
))￿(y)dy
￿ 2￿
XM
m= M+1
2 +1
Z am+ ￿
￿
am
(1 ￿ (y ￿ (a1 +
￿
2￿
)))￿(y)dy
= A ￿
4￿
￿2
￿
2M
￿ 2￿
￿ ￿ 2
￿2
￿
2M
￿ ￿
M2 ￿ 1
2M2 + Y
= A ￿
2￿
￿M
￿ ￿
￿ ￿ 2
￿M
￿ ￿
M2 ￿ 1
2M2 + Y (10)
Appendix C.2: Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. As @MV ￿ = M￿￿￿
M3￿ ￿, @MV ￿ = 0 for M = ￿=￿ > 1 since ￿ > 2￿. This means that
@MV ￿ < 0 in the interval [1; ￿=(2￿)]. Thus V ￿(M) decreases with M, and the maximum
of V ￿(M) is reached when M = 1. On the other hand, the ￿ at-earth welfare is given
by V (￿ at earth) =
Z 1
0
￿
A ￿ ￿ ￿
Z 1
0
T(x;y)dy + Y
￿
dx = A ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿=2 + Y . It is always
inferior to V ￿(M = 1) when the single city ￿ts the circumference perimeter (￿ > 2￿).
6.3 Appendix C.3: Proof of Proposition 5
Now we derive the ￿rst best spatial distribution. By assuming that the opportunity cost
of land is 0, the ￿rst best spatial con￿guration solves the following problem
max
￿(:)
Z ￿
A ￿
Z
T(x;y)￿(y)dy ￿
￿
2
￿(x) + Y
￿
￿(x)dx
st.
Z
￿(x)dx = 1
The Lagrange functional L is given by
L =
Z ￿
A ￿
Z
T(x;y)￿(y)dy ￿
￿
2
￿(x) + Y
￿
￿(x)dx ￿ ￿(
Z
￿(x)dx ￿ 1)
26where ￿ is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the total population constraint. The
￿rst variation of L is given by
Z ￿
A ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿(x) ￿ 2
Z
T(x;y)￿(y)dy + Y
￿
e ￿(x)dx
Since at the optimum, this variation should be zero, we have
Z
T(x;y)￿(y)dy +
￿
2
￿(x) =
A ￿ ￿ + Y
2
Given that S(x) ￿
￿
2￿(x) = A ￿
Z
T(x;y)￿(y)dy ￿
￿
2￿(x), the above expression can
rewritten as
S(x) ￿
￿
2
￿(x) =
A + ￿ ￿ Y
2
It means that at the optimum V (x) = S(x) ￿
￿
2￿(x) is constant. Compared to the
decentralized equilibrium, ￿=2 appears instead of ￿. As a consequence the optimal city
is more concentrated than the equilibrium city. The optimal welfare is then given by
Relation (10),
V
￿(M = 1;￿=2) = A ￿
￿
2
+
￿
2
￿ ￿
￿
q
4￿
￿=2
= A ￿
￿
2
p
2
p
￿￿
provided that the optimal city ￿ts the circumference perimeter (￿ > ￿).
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Figure 1:  Two examples of spatial distributions that are not equilibria. 
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